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TRANSFER DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS: A
NEEDED ADDITION TO HISTORIC
PRESERVATION IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Buildings and areas with special historic, cultural, or architectural sig-
nificance reveal our nation's historical heritage and commemorate its cul-
tural past.' Despite the abundance of protective federal, state, and local
legislation,2 preservation of America's architectural landmarks has been
dismally ineffective. Over fifty percent of the 12,000 structures listed in the
1933 Historic American Building Survey have been disfigured or de-
stroyed, usually to provide for more intensive urban development.3 The
District of Columbia has not escaped the destruction of its own irreplacea-
ble buildings of historical or cultural significance. Effective legislation
must be developed to protect the numerous official landmarks that exist in
1. The public benefit of historic preservation is both educational and aesthetic. As the
Supreme Court has noted, "structures with special historic, cultural, or architectural signifi-
cance enhance the quality of life for all. Not only do these buildings and their workmanship
represent the lessons of the past and embody precious features of our heritage, they serve as
examples of quality for today." Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
108 (1978).
Historic preservation may also serve to benefit a local community economically. Gener-
ally, restoration of early buildings in a neighborhood results in a material increase in both
property values and local tax revenues. Additionally, an increase in tourism is also a
favorable by-product of historic preservation. See generally Note, Land Use Controls in
Historic Areas, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 379, 383-88 (1969). Old Town Alexandria in Vir-
ginia and the historic Georgetown district in the District of Columbia are examples of met-
ropolitan Washington's economically successful restored neighborhoods. There has been,
however, an almost complete displacement of the many poor residents of these neighbor-
hoods. See note 32 infra.
2. Recent federal legislation includes the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966.
16 U.S.C. §§ 470 to 470(t) (1976). As early as 1935, Congress declared, "a national policy to
preserve for the public use historic sites, buildings and objects of national significance for the
inspiration and benefit of the people of the United States." The Historic Sites Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 461 (1976). See generally Gray, The Response of Federal Legislation to Historic Preserva-
tion, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 314 (1971).
State and local landmarks legislation and programs are reviewed in Brenneman, Historic
Preservation Restrictions. A Sampling of State Statutes, 8 CONN. L. REV. 231 (1976); Cos-
tonis, The Chicago Plan. Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban Landmarks, 85
HARV. L. REV. 574, 580-84 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Costonis, The Chicago Plan]; Ger-
stell, Needed- A Landmark Decision, 8 URB. LAW. 213 (1976); Wiedl, Historic District Ordi-
nances, 8 CONN. L. REV. 209 (1976); Wilson & Winkler, The Response of State Legislation to
Historic Preservation, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 329 (1971).
3. Huxtable, Bank's Building Sets Off Debate on "Progress," N.Y. Times, Jan. 17,
1971, § 8, at 1, col. 2.
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the District.4
The importance of an effective historic preservation program in the Dis-
trict of Columbia cannot be overemphasized. As the nation's capital,
Washington, D.C. is also the nation's showcase to the world. Thus, in an
attempt to prevent further dissipation of its historic endowment, the Dis-
trict recently enacted "The Historic Landmark and Historic District Pro-
tection Act of 1978" (Historic Protection Act).' The Act endeavors to
protect, enhance, and perpetuate landmarks and districts representing the
city's cultural and architectural history.
Although its goals are ambitious, the District's Historic Protection Act is
conceptually akin to legislative plans in other jurisdictions which have
failed to adequately preserve historic landmarks. After analyzing the fail-
ure of these traditional historic preservation efforts in the United States,
this comment will focus on the District of Columbia Act and propose the
adoption of a new historic protection plan, incorporating a development
guidance technique-transfer of development rights (TDR)-which has
been successfully tested in several American cities.
I. HISTORIC PRESERVATION PROGRAMS: THE BASIS FOR FAILURE
The failure of this country's historic preservation programs reflects a
fundamental conflict between the economic interests of private property
owners and public preservation goals.6 Preservation of historic landmarks
in high land value areas, such as downtown locations, is generally less
profitable than redevelopment of office buildings that utilize maximum
permissible rental space.7 Landmark owners often are prohibited from
modernizing their structures to increase operational productivity' and also
4. Eleven historic districts and 330 official landmarks existed in the District of Colum-
bia as of March 8, 1979. Oman, New Law Protects District Landmarks, Wash. Post, March
8, 1979, § D.C., at 1, col. 2.
5. Act No. 2-318, 25 D.C. Reg. 6939 (1979). The Act was submitted to the D.C. City
Council as D.C. Bill 2-367 on June 28, 1978 by Council member John A. Wilson. It was
signed by Mayor Walter E. Washington on Dec. 28, 1978 and became law on March 3, 1979
after congressional review.
6. For a discussion of this conflict, see Costonis, The Chicago Plan, supra note 2, at
575; Gerstell, supra note 2, at 213-14.
7. Although many restoration projects have been economically successful, see note 1
supra, some historic landmarks are vulnerable to demolition as part of more profitable de-
velopment schemes. Often a landmark situated in a downtown office area may operate at a
loss. In such a case, a new replacement structure offering increased profit through greater
rental space and decreased maintenance costs may prove too enticing to overlook. See
Costonis, The Chicago Plan, supra note 2, at 579.
8. An example of the negative effects of landmark designation is Chicago's Old Stock
Exchange Building. The structure was located in Chicago's Loop, an area of skyscrapers
and enormous land values. Designation would have diminished the site's value for the pur-
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find it difficult to secure mortgage financing for their encumbered proper-
ties. 9 To be effective, municipal zoning ordinances must have the coopera-
tion of landmark owners. Such cooperation can be insured only if the
economic burdens of landmark designation are recognized and alleviated.
Most preservation ordinances, however, fail to address this problem.
Typical municipal preservation ordinances' ° set forth criteria to be used
by city landmark commissions or other municipal bodies for the designa-
tion of buildings or areas as historic landmarks." After designation,
landmark owners must give prior notice to landmark commissions before
alteration or demolition. In some cities the commission has the absolute
power to prevent demolition or alteration of a landmark' 2 while in others
the commission's power is limited to formal requests to legislatures to save
the landmark by purchase or condemnation.' 3 Another variant prevents
the commission from denying alteration or demolition requests until the
landmark commission formulates a compromise plan accommodating
both the landowner's desires as well as historic preservation objectives.' 4
The inability of the landmark commission to prevent destruction of
landmarks is a major and obvious reason why many historic preservation
ordinances have failed; but even ordinances prohibiting landmark demoli-
tion or alteration frequently contain loopholes that undermine their effec-
tiveness. One of the widest loopholes is the economic hardship exception.
This exception allows landmark owners to alter or demolish their build-
pose of assembling lots for a large office building and prevented substantial internal renova-
tion to increase efficiency. Id at 579-80.
Even in downtown sections, however, designation can sometimes produce economic bene-
fits for landmark owners. One commentator has noted that "[i]ts prestige factor could oper-
ate to attract stable, high quality tenants and to reinforce pride of ownership which would be
reflected in the marketplace." Id at 580 n.22. See note I supra.
9. Id at 580.
10. The discussion in this section is drawn primarily from Costonis, The Chicago Plan,
supra note 2, at 580-84; and Wilson & Winkler, supra note 2, at 329.
11. Costonis, The Chicago Plan, supra note 2, at 581 n.25; Wilson & Winkler, supra note
2, at 336.
12. Costonis, The Chicago Plan, supra note 2, at 581.
13. Id at 582. Some states vest their historic preservation commissions with the power
of eminent domain to acquire and hold title or other interests in historic property. The
major impediment to widespread public acquisition is a lack of public funds available for
the acquisition of historic properties. Extensive public ownership of historic property has
also been thought unwise in some states because it "reduces the community tax base and
burdens the public budget with costs of acquisition and maintenance." Wilson & Winkler,
supra note 2, at 339. For a discussion of the problems of the public acquisition of the fee in
the preservation of open space, see Rose, A Proposalfor the Separation and Marketability of
Development Rights as a Technique to Preserve Open Space, 51 J. URB. L. 461, 465 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Rose, Open Space].
14. See Costonis, The Chicago Plan, supra note 2, at 581 n.28.
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ings if they can prove to the landmark commission that preservation of the
landmark will burden them economically. Urban landmark owners have
used this loophole to plead that the loss of potential income occurring
when downtown landmark sites are not developed to their full economic
potential creates economic hardship.' 5
Subjective and amorphous standards for approving landmark altera-
tions or destruction frequently provide another loophole, especially when
the decisionmakers are legislative officers vulnerable to political pres-
sures. 6 An additional problem is the failure of legislation to preserve the
settings of historic structures by regulating adjacent structures.Y7 The spe-
cial historic, cultural, or architectural value of a landmark is lost if it is
surrounded by a mammoth office or industrial complex. The problems
underlying these loopholes are poor legislative drafting and a failure to
provide landmark commissions with the necessary power needed to effec-
tuate preservation goals.'"
II. THE D.C. HISTORIC PROTECTION ACT
An examination of the District of Columbia's Historic Landmark and
Historic District Protection Act 19 pinpoints why municipal zoning ordi-
nances fail to preserve urban landmarks. The D.C. Act calls for the
designation of both individual landmarks and entire historic districts.2°
Actual designation rests with an Historic Preservation Review Board ap-
15. For a more lengthy discussion of the "economic hardship exception," see note 26
and accompanying text infra.
16. See text accompanying notes 27-28 infra for a discussion of this loophole.
17. One means of preserving an historic setting is to require new structures in an his-
toric district or near a landmark to conform to the existing architectural style. See Wilson &
Winkler, supra note 2, at 338.
18. For a general overview of the problems existing in state laws dealing with historic
preservation, see Wilson & Winkler, supra note 2, at 329.
19. Act No. 2-318, 25 D.C. Reg. 6939 (1979). See note 5 supra.
20. Id at § 3(f), 25 D.C. Reg. at 6942. An historic landmark is defined as a:
building, structure, object or feature, and its site, or a site (1) listed in the National
Register of Historic Places as of the effective date of this act; or (2) listed in the
District of Columbia's inventory of historic sites, or for which application for such
listing is pending with the Historic Preservation Review Board...
and approved for designation within 90 days. Id An historic district is defined as:
an historic district (1) listed in the National Register of Historic Places as of the
effective date of this Act; (2) nominated to the National Register by the State His-
toric Preservation Officer for the District of Columbia; or (3) which the State His-
toric Preservation Officer has issued a written determination to nominate to the




pointed by the mayor's office and confirmed by the D.C. City Council.2
Designation is mandatory if the historic landmark or district is listed in the
National Register of Historic Places, has been nominated to the National
Register of State Historic Preservation Office for the District of Columbia,
or is listed or is being considered for listing in the District of Columbia's
inventory of historic sites. Individual landmarks and designated buildings
or structures within an historic district may not be demolished, altered, or
subdivided without mayoral approval.22 Before making his decision, the
mayor is usually required to refer applications to the Historic Preservation
Review Board.23 Unless the Review Board advises that the building or
structure does not contribute to the historic district or landmark, the mayor
must hold a public hearing.24 Requests to demolish, alter, or subdivide
designated landmarks or districts will not be approved unless the mayor
finds that approval is "necessary in the public interest," or that the
landmark owner will otherwise suffer "unreasonable economic hard-
ship."25
Although the D.C. Act commendably provides for the prevention of
landmark destruction, it contains many of the same loopholes plaguing
other municipal historic preservation statutes. The Act's economic hard-
ship exception26 could prove to be a major defect in a city with rapidly
rising land values. Since the difference in value between the present and
potential use of landmark sites in Washington is substantial, landmark
owners may be able to argue successfully that forbearance of more profita-
21. Id at § 4, 25 D.C. Reg. at 6944. The Review Board's membership must meet the
requirements of a State Review Board as issued by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to
the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966. Id See 16 U.S.C. § 470(b) (1976); 36
C.F.R. § 61.4 (1978).
22. Act No. 2-318, §§ 5-8, 25 D.C. Reg. 6939, 6946-53 (1979).
23. Sections 5-8 of the D.C. Act require the mayor to refer all applications for demoli-
tion, alteration, subdivision, and new construction of historic districts or landmarks to the
Historic Preservation Review Board unless the applications are subject to review by the
Commission of Fine Arts under the Old Georgetown Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 104-106 (1976), D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 5-801-807 (1973), or the Shipstead-Luce Act, 40 U.S.C. § 121 (1976), D.C.
CODE ANN. § 5-410 (1973). The Commission of Fine Arts was established pursuant to 40
U.S.C. § 104 (1976).
24. Act No. 2-318, §§ 5-8, 25 D.C. Reg. 6939, 6946-53 (1979).
25. Id at §§ 5(e), 6(f) & 7(e), 25 D.C. Reg. at 6947, 6950-51 & 6952.
26. The exception provides:
[u]nreasonable economic hardship means that failure to issue a permit would
amount to a taking of the owner's property without just compensation or, in the
case of a low-income owner(s) as determined by the Mayor, failure to issue a per-
mit would place an onerous and excessive financial burden upon such owner(s).
Id at § 3(n), 25 D.C. Reg. at 6944.
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ble sale or development of their sites to preserve a landmark equals an
economic hardship.
A loophole with even greater potential to thwart the Act's objectives is
the public interest exception. This exception permits the mayor to allow
alteration or demolition of a landmark if he finds it necessary to allow the
construction of a project of "special merit."27 Such a project is "a plan or
building having significant benefits to the District of Columbia or to the
community by virtue of exemplary architecture, specific features of land
planning, or social or other benefits having a priority for community serv-
ices. '"28 This amorphous standard might enable landmark owners to ob-
tain approval for destruction of historic sites by pointing to the economic
benefits of their desired projects in the form of greater tax revenues and the
attraction of more business to the city.
Other pitfalls of historic preservation ordinances plague the D.C. Act.
For example, unless the interior space of a building is designated as an
historic landmark, which is rarely done, the mayor's control is limited to
the exterior of the structure. Thus a landmark owner can allow his build-
ing to decay inside, forcing demolition for health and safety reasons.29
This problem could be averted by broadening the Act's definition of "dem-
olition" to include demolition caused by neglect. To accomplish this goal,
the Act could require maintenance of the historic landmark's structural
soundness under threat of criminal penalty to the owner. In turn, this re-
quirement could be supported by public policy to protect community
health and safety.3"
Although uniform and coordinated administration is critical to the suc-
cess of the statutory scheme for historic preservation, the Act has not re-
ceived a warm reception from the two federal agencies with control over
historic landmarks and districts in the city. Both the United States Com-
mission of Fine Arts and the Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corpora-
tion bitterly contested the passage of the law. They may seek judicial
exemption from its jurisdiction, claiming it will cause unnecessary and
possibly illegal duplication of review.3 In addition, because designation
27. Id. at § 3(j), (k), 25 D.C. Reg. at 6943.
28. Id at § 3(k), 25 D.C. Reg. at 6943.
29. See Wilson & Winkler, supra note 2, at 337.
30. This suggestion was made by Wilson & Winkler, and is used by the city of New
Orleans to regulate its French Quarter. Id. at 337 n.39.
31. J. Carter Brown, head of the Commission of Fine Arts, charged that the Act "raises
legal questions regarding possible dilution of the two federal statutes under which the Arts
Commission operates." Brown claims to have a legal opinion from the U.S. Department of
Justice backing his view. The Pennsylvania Avenue Development Corporation, created to
coordinate the development of Pennsylvania Avenue between the White House and the
[Vol. 28:833
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will almost inevitably result in displacement of the poor,32 some members
of the District of Columbia City Council have also contested the passage
of the Act.
Unlike ordinances in other cities, the D.C. Act provides no right of ap-
peal from either an initial designation of landmark status or from a denied
request for alterations.33 The lack of appellate review renders the Act con-
stitutionally suspect as a taking of property without due process. 34 The
major problem to overcome before any historic preservation legislation in
the District can become effective, however, is the development of an effec-
tive means to lessen the economic burden that landmark designation
places on landmark owners. One alternative is the incorporation of the
new zoning technique known as the transfer of development rights into the
new District Historic Protection Act.
III. TDR: TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS
Traditional preservation planning techniques assume that the develop-
ment potential of a site, as determined by its zoning designation, is to be
used only on that site.35 The concept of transfer of development rights
Capitol, is concerned that the new board might slow down its plans. Wash. Star, Dec. 28,
1978, § M.C., at 2, col. 2 (Montgomery County, Md. edition).
32. Georgetown is representative of the displacement pattern in an historic district.
When the neighborhood's historic value was recognized, speculators began offering irresisti-
ble prices to homeowners. As speculative activity grew, property values rose further, and
many homeowners who were unable to pay the increased property taxes were forced to sell.
Additionally, tenants who were unable to match the significantly higher rent demands for
restored houses were also forced to relocate. By 1950, most of the original lower income
black residents had moved from Georgetown. See Newsom, Blacks and Historic Preserva-
lion, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 423 (1971). A similar "Georgetown syndrome" has re-
cently developed in the Adams Morgan and Capitol Hill neighborhoods in the city of
Washington. See Wash. Post, June 21, 1979, § B, at 1, col. 1.
33. The New York Landmark Preservation Law provides for judicial review after initial
designation and following a refusal by the landmark commission to grant a request for alter-
ation. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A (1976). Seegenerall, Wilson & Winkler, supra note 2,
at 338. The authors recommend that municipal preservation ordinances have the procedural
safeguards of "notice to the owner or occupant, opportunity for a hearing or remonstrance,
and review by the governing body of the municipality with ultimate resort to the courts."
Id
34. The Supreme Court has suggested that the same constitutional right to judicial re-
view of zoning ordinances also attaches to landmark designation or restriction. Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 132-33 (1978).
35. Most zoning regulations involve a combination of use, bulk, and density restrictions
proportional to the size of the lot and appropriate to its location. Bulk restrictions increas-
ingly have taken the form of floor area ratios (F.A.R.) limiting the size of buildings in pro-
portion to the size of the property. The F.A.R. is the total floor area on a particular lot
divided by the log square footage. 3 R. ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 16,
11 (2d ed. 1976). F.A.R. limitations are generally dictated by what the municipality can or
1979]
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(TDR)36 also measures the development potential of real property by its
zoning control but severs the tie between zoned land and its development
potential. It permits the development potential of one parcel of land to be
transferred to another, where greater density will not be objectionable.
TDR thus hurdles the major obstacle stifling traditional preservation ordi-
nances-the landmark owner's economic interest. By allowing the land-
mark owner to sell the development right attaching to it for economic gain,
TDR offers a viable historic preservation tool.
3 7
TDR programs characteristically have four phases. In the first phase,
landmark sites are chosen from which development rights can be severed
and then transferred. These sites are referred to as "conservation zones"
and contain historic landmarks and areas where restricted development is
desired." In the second phase, correlative "transfer zones" are estab-
lished. These zones are permitted to receive the transferred density or de-
velopment potential rights severed from parcels of land in the conservation
zones.3 9 Only areas that can accommodate added density without damag-
ing either overall city planning goals or the architectural characteristics of
the neighborhood will be designated as transfer zones. 40 In the third
phase, a device to facilitate the actual transfer of rights from conservation
wants to support in terms of services to that particular area and by what it determines to be
an appropriate density for the area's character. F.A.R. regulations work in the following
way: the density permitted for a particular lot is determined by multiplying the area of a lot
square footage by the prescribed F.A.R. The resulting product is the number of rentable
square feet that may be contained within the building erected on the lot. See generally W.
GOODMAN & E. FREUND, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF URBAN PLANNING, 430 (4th ed.
1968).
In addition to the traditional zoning ordinances which allocate density on a lot-by-lot
basis with the same density ceiling imposed on lots of equal size, a second zoning technique
labeled density zoning is often used. Under density zoning, a total volume of density is
allocated for an entire tract or district and may be concentrated or dispersed over that area
in accordance with the developer's plans. See 0. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING & LAND
DEVELOPMENT LAW 456 (1971).
36. An overview of the TDR concept and operation is set forth in Costonis, Develop-
ment Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75, 85-86 (1973) [hereinafter
referred to as Costonis, Development Rights Transfer]. See also Schnidman, Transferable
Development Rights.- An Idea in Search of Implementation, II LAND AND WATER L. REV.
339 (1976).
37. See Merriam, Making TDR Work, 56 N.C.L. REV. 80, 81-82 (1978). See also
Schnidman, TDR." A Tool For More Equitable Land Management, ENVT'L COM., April
1978, at 12.
38. Schnidman, supra note 37, at 12; Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommo-
dation Power- Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 1021, 1062 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Costonis, The Accommodation Power].
39. Costonis, The Accommodation Power, supra note 38, at 1062-63.




zones to transfer zones must be established.4 Finally, standards must be
devised to determine what compensation landmark owners are to receive
for their losses.42
The legal concept underlying TDR is that title to property is not a singu-
lar right, but rather a bundle of numerous transferable rights in a piece of
property.4 3 In America, ownership rights have traditionally evolved from
the land itself, or "up from the bottom."'  Development restrictions have
been considered limitations imposed by the government on the right to
build. In contrast, the TDR is a "down from the top" concept that consid-
ers rights of ownership to evolve from governmental zoning decisions
about the apportionment of densities in a community.4 5
A. Legal Antecedents of TDR
TDR is not an entirely new concept. It has precursors in early American
transportation systems, dam rights acts, major drainage and irrigation
projects, and oil and gas production regulations.46 In the mid 1800's, the
use of eminent domain by state-selected private corporations to plan, con-
struct, and maintain private toll roads was commonplace.47 This practice
established the precedent that led to the private sale and transfer of devel-
41. Numerous devices exist to facilitate the transfer of rights from conservation zones to
transfer zones. Some techniques only permit transfers between private landowners. Others
allow only the government to transfer development rights. A third scheme allows the gov-
ernment to make a transfer only after a private landowner refuses. See Costonis, The Ac-
commodation Power, supra note 38, at 1062-63.
42. Id at 1063.
43. Rose, The Transfer of Development Rights- An Interim Review of an Evolving Con-
cept, in TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS 3 (J. Rose ed. 1975). TDR is a departure
from traditional property concepts. It assumes that a transferable real property interest does
not have to be uniquely located in space and that'ownership does not always entail domin-
ion over a particular piece of earth. See Case Comment, 90 HARV. L. REV. 637, 640-42
(1977). Unlike the sale of subsoil rights, see note 52 infra, a sale of development rights does
not involve the transfer of anything located in space.
44. Schnidman, supra note 37, at 12.
45. Id This "down from the top" theory is also evident in cluster and Planned Unit
Development (PUD) zoning concepts. See note 52 infra. TDR permits the transfer of the
unused density potential of land to noncontiguous land owned by others. See Merriam,
supra note 37, at 81-82. TDR also envisions a community cluster or PUD whereby the
overall density in the area stays the same while the location of the density within the com-
munity PUD shifts. Schnidman, supra note 37, at 12. For a general introduction to cluster-
ing and PUD, see note 52 infra.
46. For a discussion of these four early American legal precedents to TDR, see Carmi-
chael, Transferable Development Rights as a Basis for Land Use Control, 2 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 34, 53-99 (1974).
47. To facilitate the construction, maintenance and control of their toll roads and turn-
pikes, the colonies and early states empowered private corporations to acquire rights-of-way
after payment of compensation to the landowner. Public necessity, use, and ratification by
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opment rights in order to accommodate the public's need for transporta-
tion. Milldam Acts4 8 permitted a private owner of land watered by a
stream to create rights in himself by erecting a dam to harness water
power; but in exchange for this privilege, the dam owner was required to
compensate downstream land owners for loss of irrigation. The courts
upheld such legislation as a reasonable exercise of police power under the
doctrine of "correlative rights."'49  Similarly, the American drainage and
irrigation projects of the 1800's permitted qualified owners within a desig-
nated district to operate water projects, set boundaries, and charge area
landowners a fee in proportion to the benefit received."0 In addition, early
twentieth century gas and oil regulations providing for pooling and uni-
tization of output provide precedent for TDR. Pooling regulations re-
quired owners of property containing gas or oil fields to share their
resources with neighbors.5 The equalization of development rights of
each landowner in mutual gas and oil pools resulted in the curtailment of
each owner's development potential.
Also providing close analogies to TDR are more recent density transfer
techniques, including planned unit development (PUD), clustering, and air
rights transfers.5 2 These techniques commonly view density as a severable
custom prevented direct challenge of the use of eminent domain authority by these private
companies. Id at 53-54.
48. Citations to several Milldam Acts can be found in Otis Co. v. Ludlow Mfg. Co., 201
U.S. 140, 151 (1906); Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 16-20 (1885); Talbot v. Hud-
son, 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 417, 426 (1860).
49. Carmichael, supra note 46, at 58-66. The doctrine of "correlative rights" refers to
the rights of individual owners that arise from their mutual relationship to a common re-
source. Id
50. Through the use of these drainage and irrigation projects, individual owners re-
tained ownership and use of affected lands. The services obtained by owners within the
drainage and irrigation districts were assessed and a commensurate charge was levied on the
owner to the extent of the benefit received by him. Carmichael, supra note 46, at 76-77.
51. For a lengthy discussion of early American oil and gas production regulations, see
id at 77-97. For a summary of the legal doctrines underlying oil and gas regulations which
provide a basis for the use of development rights transfers, see id. at 97-99.
52. A planned unit development (PUD) is an innovative means of regulating a residen-
tial or industrial development project in which local density regulations apply to the project
as a whole rather than to its individual lots. 5 J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CON-
TROLS § 32.01[1] (1978). Typically, the technique permits clusters of high density, but PUD
is more than merely a technique for clustering densities to create open space. A departure
from traditional lot-by-lot regulation, PUD contemplates the planned development of an
entire tract and is well suited to multiple use development projects. Specific plans are usu-
ally developed within a broad legislative mandate after meetings between a local zoning
board and the interested developer. Benefits to the community from PUD uses include the
saving of building costs, the preservation of open space, and the reduction of the ancillary
costs of urban sprawl. 5 COUNCIL EVNT'L QUAL. ANN. REP. 51-54 (1974), excerpts reprinted
in J. BEUSCHER, R. WRIGHT, & GITELMAN, LAND USE 506 (2d ed. 1976). See generally
[Vol. 28:833
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right in land which can be transferred to and concentrated in other tracts
of land. The TDR concept also has been used by numerous legislative
bodies and sanctioned by the courts to further government acquisition of
use rights in private tracts of land.53 These takings have facilitated the
installation of utility poles,54 prohibited the construction of certain classes
56Asiof buildings in residential areas,55 and preserved open space. As in
TDR, these acquisitions restrict or prohibit an owner's right to develop
part of his land in return for compensation. In contrast to TDR, however,
they involve only partial fee acquisition and therefore do not strip the land
owner of any other rights of ownership.
IV. EXPERIENCE WITH TDR PROGRAMS
A. The Unsuccessful British Experience
In 1947, the British Town and Country Planning Act (T.C. Act)57 as-
sumed the entire development rights of all undeveloped land in England.
leaving owners with all remaining rights of ownership except the right to
build or change present use. 58 Precedent for such nationalization of devel-
opment rights can be found in a 1909 planning statute which created a
Merriam, supra note 37, at 86-87. See also Kristof, Planned Unit Development- New Term
and Public Policy in FRONTIERS OF PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT 62-74 (R. Burchell ed.
1973) (planned unit development); W. GOODMAN & E. FREUND, supra note 35, at 478, 480.
The severance and sale of air rights has gained general acceptance. Railroads, for exam-
ple, can sell the right to construct a building over their tracts. See Schnidman, supra note
36, at 343-45. The value of air rights is well illustrated by the recent sale by the Museum of
Modem Art in New York of its air rights to construct a forty-four story apartment tower
over the museum. N.Y. Times, June 10, 1979 § 1, at i, col. 3.
53. In acquiring use rights, the government takes less than a fee simple interest. The
courts have generally recognized the power of eminent domain over rights of use. See Rose,
Open Space, supra note 13, at 471.
54. Id (citing Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 72 Cal. App. 2d
638, 165 P.2d 741 (1946)).
55. Rose, Open Space, supra note 13, at 471, (citing State exrel. Twin City Bldg. & Inv.
Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 174 N.W. 885 (1919)).
56. Id See Weissburg, LegalAlternatives to Police Power.- Condemnation and Purchase,
Development Rights, Gifts in OPEN SPACE AND THE LAW (F. Herring ed. 1965); LAND Ac-
QUISITION FOR OUTDOOR RECREATION: ANALYSIS OF SELECTED LEGAL PROBLEMS (U.S.
Outdoor Recreation Resources Rev. Comm. Study Rep. No. 16, 1963).
57. TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING ACT, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 51. See Rose, Open
Space, supra note 13, at 467-68; Merriam, supra note 37, at 88-89 for a discussion of this Act.
58. As one commentator noted:
Indeed, after July 1, 1948, ownership of land carries with it nothing more than the
bare right to go on using it for its existing purpose. The owner has no right to
develop it, that is to say, he has no right to build on it and no right to change its
use.
Rose, Open Space, supra note 13, at 496 n.3, (quoting D. HEAP, AN OUTLINE OF PLANNING
LAW 12 (1963)).
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national system for town planning based upon the assumption that govern-
ment regulation of private lands would provide the most effective means
for development. 9 The legislation was the result of three British govern-
ment reports concerned with land use problems caused by heavy concen-
trations of industry and population.60 The reports recommended that the
public welfare should take precedent over private land use rights. They
proposed that a national land use plan be drawn up to allow government
control of land without government acquisition through the separation of
the development rights from the land and their transfer to the public.61
Landowners were compensated for the value of their severed development
rights at the time of the government taking.62 If an owner wanted to de-
velop his land, he was required to repurchase his development right from
the government. The selling price of the right was the estimated increase
in value that the development right would add to the purchaser's land.63
The TDR system under the British T.C. Act was not an effective one.
Development came almost to a standstill after its enactment. Refusing to
accept the fact that their rights to develop their land had been publicly
acquired, owners refused to sell their land at less than its unencumbered
pre-1947 value.64 Buyers, however, who were required to pay the govern-
ment for the privilege of development, refused to pay the prices the sellers
demanded for their encumbered land. This conflict, which destroyed the
marketability of the land, resulted in the repeal of the T.C. Act and subse-
quent revisions in 197 1.65
The unsuccessful British experiment provides an important lesson for
subsequent TDR development plans. A mandatory full scale TDR system
must be based on a full understanding of the realities of the real estate
market and the private landowner's concern about all the inherent rights
of ownership. Without such an understanding, the costs of a full scale
TDR system will outweigh any potential benefit such a system will pro-
vide.66 It would also be a mistake, however, to condemn the use of TDR
59. For a detailed discussion of the British experience, see Merriam, supra note 37, at
88-89; Rose, Open Space, supra note 13, at 467-70.
60. The Barlow, Othwatt, and Scott reports are discussed in Rose Open Space, supra
note 13, at 468-69.
61. Id
62. Id This fund contained the initial sum of 300 million pounds. 10 & I I Geo. 6, c.
51, §§ 20, 50, sched. 4 (1947).
63. Id at §§ 69, 70 (1947). See Rose, Open Space, supra note 13, at 469.
64. M. CLAWSON & P. HALL, PLANNING AND URBAN GROWTH 163 (1973); Rose, Open
Space, supra note 13, at 469.
65. Rose, Open Space, supra note 13, at 470. See also B. POOLEY, THE EVOLUTION OF
BRITISH PLANNING LEGISLATION 84 (1960).
66. See Merriam, supra note 37, at 89.
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as a land use concept because of its failure in Britain. The United States
has had a limited but successful experience with the TDR concept. An
analysis of these experiences can provide the means to increase TDR's ef-
fectiveness in solving land planning problems such as historic preserva-
tion.
B. New York City TDR Plans
New York City became the first American city to apply a TDR program
for the preservation of urban landmarks when it enacted the Landmarks
Preservation Law of 1965.67 While it restricts landmark development, the
New York law provides landmark owners both an opportunity for eco-
nomic profit and the freedom to develop their land through uses not incon-
sistent with preservation goals.68 Like the Historic Protection Act of the
District of Columbia, the New York Act designates landmarks and re-
quires owners to obtain advance permission before structurally altering
landmark sites.69 In contrast to the D.C. Act, however, landmark designa-
tion under the New York Act does not necessarily destroy the potential
economic gain an owner could recoup from his property. The New York
law preserves a landmark owner's opportunity for profit by permitting the
sale of development rights to designated transfer zones for compensa-
tion.7°
The underlying premise of the New York TDR system is that the value
of any given parcel of land in the city is directly related to the density or
intensity of development permitted under the applicable zoning law.7 '
Since landmarks often have an excess of authorized but unbuilt floor area,
a landmark owner has a valuable commodity to sell, thereby mitigating
any potential economic loss due to landmark designation.72 Moreover,
once these development rights are sold, the value of the remaining fee sim-
ple in the land is proportionally reduced. Subsequent purchasers can buy
67. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A (1976).
68. For a brief summary of the New York Act, see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104,110-15 (1978). For a more thorough discussion of New York City's
Landmark Preservation Law, see Rankin, Operation and Interpretation of the New York City
Landmarks Preservation Law, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 366 (1971).
69. Compare N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE, ch. 8-A, §§ 207-4.0 to -9.0 (1976) with Act 2-318, §
6, D.C. Reg. 6949-6950 (1979).
70. NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION art. VII, ch. 4, §§ 74-79, 74-791 to 793
(1971). For a detailed discussion of how a landmark owner in New York City can obtain
approval for the transfer of development rights, see Costonis The Chicago Plan, supra note 2,
at 585-86.
71. A concise summary of the use of a TDR scheme in New York City is provided in
Rose, Open Space, supra note 13, at 473.
72. Id See also Merriam, supra note 37, at 80-82; Schnidman, supra note 37, at 12.
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only the reduced fee simple and are barred from developing the landmark
parcel.73 This system should nullify any economic incentive to the
landmark owner to destroy his landmark and redevelop the property in a
more profitable manner. In addition, the owner is compensated for any
economic loss caused by the development restriction on the property.
The importance of the New York Act as a demonstration of TDR's via-
bility as a land use technique lies not in its design nor in its success. For
example, only two historic structures in New York have been saved by the
Act so far.7' The Act is significant, however, because in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York75 it provided a means for the
courts to implicitly validate TDR as a constitutional exercise of state police
power.
C. Penn Central
Grand Central Station is a magnificent French beaux arts style structure
owned by the Penn Central Transportation Company and its affiliates. In
1967, the New York Landmark Preservation Commission (Commission)
designated Grand Central a "landmark" over the objections of its own-
ers.7 6 The following year, in an effort to increase its revenues, Grand Cen-
tral entered into an agreement with a British developer who planned to
construct a multistory bffice building over the terminal. The Commission,
however, would not grant permission to construct the highrise.77 Penn
Central and the developer filed suit in the New York Supreme Court,
claiming that the application of the Landmarks Preservation Law in their
case was an unconstitutional taking of property without the due process
requirement of just compensation.78
73. Rose, Open Space, supra note 13, at 473-74.
74. The New York Act has been criticized for lacking efficiency of design and opera-
tion. See J. COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT: SAVING URBAN LANDMARKS THROUGH THE CHI-
CAGO PLAN 54-60 (1974) [hereinafter cited as J. COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT] (generally
describing the pitfalls of New York Act); Note, The Unconstitutionality of Transferable De-
velopment Rights, 84 YALE L.J. 1101, 1103-11 (1975) (attacking the constitutionality of the
Act); Note, Development Rights Transfer in New York City, 82 YALE L.J. 338, 370-71 (1972)
(discussing the problems with density transfers). See also Costonis, The Chicago Plan, supra
note 2, at 578 & 586-89; Rose, Open Space, supra note 13, at 474; Woodbury, Whatever
Happened to TDR? A Survey of the Status of Proposals for Transfer of Development Rights,
ENVT'L COM., Feb. 1976, at 13.
75. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
76. Id at 115.
77. The Commission summarized its reasons for denying approval of one of the submit-
ted plans in the following statement: "To protect a landmark one does not tear it down. To




After appeals in the state courts of New York,79 the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the validity of the New York City Act in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York. 80 By reasoning that the
development restrictions imposed by the New York Act on Grand Central
did not interfere with rights in the parcel as a whole,8 the Court implicitly
sanctioned TDR. The Court noted that the Act did not deny owners the
use of all pre-existing air rights in the property. Thus, it found that no
"taking" had occurred. The Court noted that while landmark designation
forestalled the owners of Grand Central from developing all their pre-ex-
isting air rights,82 those rights remained valuable to the owners of the ter-
minal because the Act allowed their sale to at least eight parcels of land in
the vicinity of the terminal.8 3 The Court found that the property's trans-
ferable development rights were valuable assets; therefore, the New York
Act's interference with Grand Central was not of sufficient magnitude to
require "an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain it. '"84
The Court did not consider, however, whether TDR would constitute "just
compensation" if a "taking" had occurred. Its analysis examined only the
extent that TDR mitigated the loss of potential income to landmark own-
ers. Significantly, TDR rights were analyzed by the Court only to deter-
mine if a "taking" had been effected.85
The Court also rebuffed a due process challenge to the Commission's
power to designate landmark status and to restrict alteration of landmarks.
Noting that landmark owners received the right of judical review after all
Commission decisions, the Court explained that there was no basis to con-
clude that the courts could not identify "arbitrary or discriminatory action
79. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 50 App. Div. 2d 265, 377
N.Y.S.2d 20 (1975), qfl'd, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977). The
Appellate Court held that historic preservation was a legitimate public purpose and that the
application of the Landmark Preservation Law to the preservation of Grand Central was
valid unless it would deprive the owner of all beneficial use of his property. The court
implicitly upheld the TDR provision in the New York Act, suggesting that Penn Central
could have obtained profitable compensation by transferring the unused development rights
over the terminal. 50 App. Div. at 271-72; 377 N.Y.S.2d at 28-29.
In unanimously affirming the Appellate Division, the New York Court of Appeals con-
cluded that Penn Central's right to transfer its severed air rights was sufficient compensation
for the loss of the right to develop above the station itself. 42 N.Y.2d at 333-36, 366 N.E.2d
at 1277-80, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 921-24.
80. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
81. Id. at 129.
82. Id. at 135.
83. Id at 137.
84. Id. at 136-37 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
85. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978).
1979]
Catholic University Law Review
in the context of landmark regulation."86 Because of the decision's limita-
tions, Penn Central's precedential value to justify TDR is questionable. In
an article published before the Court rendered its opinion, Justice Breitel,
author of the New York State Court of Appeals decision in Penn Central,
warned against attributing too much importance to the decision as a legal
justification for the use of TDR. He considered TDR a novel land use
technique that should be tested for its constitutional validity on a case-to-
case basis until it becomes generally accepted.87 The Supreme Court may
have gone further than Justice Breitel expected, however, because implicit
in the Court's threshold analysis of the transferability of TDR before rul-
ing on whether a "taking" had occurred is at least tentative endorsement of
the constitutional viability of the TDR concept.88 Thus, there is a basis for
interpreting the Court's opinion as a constitutional validation of TDR.
D. The Chicago Plan and Academic Revision of the New York
Preservation Law
Professor John J. Costonis, a critic of the New York Landmark Preser-
vation Act, has formulated a revised TDR preservation scheme known as
the "Chicago Plan."89 Unlike the New York Act, his approach provides
compensation to landmark owners for actual losses suffered. Compensa-
tion more definitively negates any claim of taking without due process.9"
To ensure a steady market in which TDR's can be transferred, the yet to
be enacted Chicago Plan establishes numerous transfer districts in down-
town areas where landmarks are usually located. The Chicago Plan per-
mits transfers to lots in the entire transfer district, not only to adjacent
properties as under the New York Act. These transfer zones are not lim-
ited to downtown areas and can be located in noncontiguous zones of po-
tential growth. Receiving lots in transfer districts are permitted to increase
86. Id. at 133. For a discussion of the importance of this judicial review, see Breitel, A
Judicial Review of Transferable Development Rights, 30 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 5
(1978).
87. See Breitel, supra note 86, at 5.
88. The Court by implication recognized that TDR's are valuable assets that could be
analyzed to determine if fair compensation had taken place and to determine if a "taking"
had occurred in landmark preservation cases. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York,
438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978).
89. A detailed account of the Chicago Plan is found in J. COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT,
supra note 74. For a comparison of the New York City approach and the Chicago Plan, see
Costonis, The Chicago Plan, supra note 2, at 590.
90. A noncash grant of a "floating" TDR, one that is not yet attached to another piece
of property, may be found to constitute inadequate compensation. See, e.g., Fred F. French
Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 597-98, 350 N.E.2d 381, 387-88, 385 N.Y.S.2d
5, 11-12, appeal dismissed, 492 U.S. 990 (1976).
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their density only up to a fixed percentage figure. 91
The most innovative feature of the Chicago Plan is its use of develop-
ment rights banks to ensure greater fairness in allocating the economic
burdens of landmark owners. Under this system, an owner who rejects the
transfer option can require the city to take the unused development right
by condemnation and purchase. These acquisitions are funded by a devel-
opment bank that sustains itself on profits received from resale of develop-
ment rights.92 To keep itself afloat, the bank will not only condemn and
sell development rights from stubborn owners, but also solicit and sell
donated development rights from privately and publicly owned
landmarks. 93 Costonis argues that the bank's solvency can be sustained
through this revolving fund created by the sale of these pooled rights.94
The Chicago Plan was not enacted because its supporters could not
overcome political forces fearful of change.95 The failure of the Chicago
Plan, however, does not undermine its importance as a TDR proposal.
The Plan provides a ready market for the transfer of development rights.
This market ensures that severed development rights can be sold to miti-
gate the financial burden on property owners caused by landmark designa-
tion. Compensation should negate any claim of a taking without due
process. Thus,the Chicago Plan is an important step toward the develop-
ment of a large scale legal landmark preservation program based on the
TDR concept.
III. TDR USE IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
A. Past Encounters
The concept of TDR is not alien to the District of Columbia. In 1971,
residents of the historic Georgetown district desired to restore the water-
front bordering the neighborhood. 96 To accomplish this goal, they ad-
91. J. COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 74, at 50-51, 60.
92. Id at 40.
93. Id at 105-06. See also Costonis, Development Rights Transfer, supra note 36, at 87.
Although "The Chicago Plan" is not part of the law of New York, the Court of Appeals of
New York has commented favorably on the proposal. See Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City
of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 598, 350 N.E.2d 381,388, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 12, appeal dismissed,
429 U.S. 990 (1976). The court was impressed with the plan's straightforward use of emi-
nent domain because it allows instant and just financial compensation for an owner's devel-
opment rights.
94. J. COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT, supra note 74, at 105-06.
95. For an analysis of the Chicago Plan's failure, see Costonis, The Chicago Plan: A
Case Study of the Gulf Between Law and Social Change in LAW AND THE CITY 18, 22-25
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Costonis, A Case Study].
96. See Von Eckardt, Getting Charm and Height, Wash. Post, Feb. 27, 1971, § C, at 1,
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vanced a TDR proposal designed to prevent the deterioration of the
waterfront into an industrial slum, to forestall the development of large
buildings on the waterfront, and to foster the efficiency of Washington's
new Metro subway system by removing the ten-story height limitation im-
posed by Congress on the city in 1910.9' To maintain low density on the
waterfront, the Georgetowners urged that presently unused waterfront de-
velopment rights be transferred to the downtown Metro subway transfer
district. Funds generated from the sale of TDR's would be used to restore
the waterfront. The plan distributed density from the historic waterfront
district under stringent rules to prevent the urban design problems that
would result from transferring severed densities to the characteristically
low density main Georgetown neighborhood. For undocumented reasons,
however, neither this plan, nor a more complex one developed by Martin
J. Rody of the National Capital Planning Commission,9" was ever imple-
mented. The failure of these TDR programs, like many others, was proba-
bly the result of the inability of planners to overcome political forces that
discourage efforts to "surmount the status quo." 99
Not all of the District's encounters with TDR's have been unsuccessful.
In 1976, the owners of several adjoining lots transferred development
rights from one building owner to another"° in order to create a Planned
Unit Development (PUD) under Article 75 of the D.C. zoning regula-
tions.' ° ' The proposed PUD was to encompass both existing and yet un-
developed buildings. Without a transfer of the development rights from
existing developed parcels to the undeveloped parcels, the PUD would
have violated the floor area ratio (F.A.R.) requirements of the D.C. Zon-
ing Regulations. °2 In order to meet the F.A.R. restrictions, the owners
proposed that development rights be transferred from the Columbia His-
torical Society's Heurich Mansion to the lot where the proposed new
building would be constructed. Such a transfer would have left the aggre-
col. 5. The waterfront proposal is also discussed in Costonis, The Chicago Plan, supra note
2, at 596 n.74 and Costonis, Development Rights Transfer, supra note 36, at 90.
97. Costonis, Development Rights Transfer, supra note 36, at 91.
98. AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, ENCOURAGING REDEVELOPMENT
THROUGH A TDR SYSTEM: GEORGETOWN WATERFRONT, D.C. (TRANSFERABLE DEVELOP-
MENT RIGHTS, PLANNING ADVISORY SERVICE REP. No. 304).
99. See Costonis, The Chicago Plan, supra note 2, at 28-29.
100. Dupont Circle Citizens Ass'n v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm'n, 355 A.2d
550 (D.C. 1976).
101. Id at 552. For a discussion of the PUD technique, see note 54 supra.
102. Id The purpose of the PUD provision is "to allow for the development of flexible
and creative residential, institutional, commercial, and urban renewal projects, or conserva-
tion thereof, that will facilitate attractive and efficient planning and design within each zon-
ing district." Id For a discussion of the use of F.A.R.'s, see note 34 supra.
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gate density of all the planned and existing buildings within the level re-
quired by the zoning regulations.° 3 It also would have benefitted not only
the developers, but also the Columbia Historical Society and the residents
of the city." The income derived by the Columbia Historical Society
from the sale of its development rights would have assured its continued
operation. Significantly, the city would have benefitted by the preserva-
tion of the Heurich Mansion, an historic landmark, enabling the develop-
ers to proceed with their project.
The Dupont Circle Citizens Association opposed the proposed develop-
ment and brought an action to halt the transfer. They argued that the D.C.
zoning statute did not permit a transfer of development rights within a
PUD. In Dupont Circle Citizens Association v. District of Columbia Zoning
Commission,10 5 however, the D.C. Court of Appeals disagreed. Noting
that the District of Columbia Code empowers the Zoning Commission
with broad authority to promulgate and enforce regulations, the court held
that the zoning regulations inherently provided for the transfer of develop-
ment rights.'0 6 The Court noted that the language of Regulation 7501.39
does not require the lots within a PUD to be of unform size. Under the
same regulation, buildings within the PUD can be of different heights and
can contain varying numbers of occupants. In relation to this uniformity
requirement, Regulation 7501.246 requires that "[t]he floor areas of all
buildings shall not exceed the aggregate of the floor area ratio as permitted
in the several districts included within the project area .. ..o7 The
court concluded that a reading of these two regulations together permitted
TDR's as natural components of the District's PUD zoning regulations. 0 8
The court's stand on two related issues in Dupont Circle boosted the
future prospects for broad scale use of TDR to preserve historic landmarks
in the District. Prior to the court's decision, the Zoning Commission's stat-
utory power to accomplish historic preservation was unclear.'0 9 The Court
of Appeals determined that the D.C. Zoning Act vested the Commission
with the power to promote through its zoning activities both the general
welfare as well as the orderly planning and development of the nation's
103. Dupont Circle, 355 A.2d at 552.
104. Id at 552-53.
105. Id. at 550.
106. The court stated that "[t]he very nature of the Planned Unit Development concept
as promulgated by the Zoning Commission . . .suggests that a transfer of development
rights from one building to another must have been contemplated as one that was both
feasible and appropriate in the development of such a plan." Id at 556-57.
107. Quoted in id at 557.
108. Id
109. Id. at 556-58.
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capital."' After concluding that historic preservation promoted the gen-
eral welfare, the court held that the Commission had reasonably exercised
its statutory power in authorizing the transfer and sale of development
rights."'
In a case of first impression, the court held that the uniformity require-
ments of the D.C. Zoning Act," 2 demanding uniformity for each class or
kind of building throughout each zoning district, were not violated by
PUD regulations permitting diversification in the use, size, type, and loca-
tion of buildings in each zoning district. The court reasoned that diversifi-
cation within a PUD is allowed because the uniformity requirements do
not demand that all buildings within a zone must be of the same charac-
ter.' 3 Thus, similar to the operation of a TDR scheme, each building's
zoning limitation as defined by its allowable floor area ratios was permit-
ted to be redistributed within the PUD zoning district.
B. Future Adaptations
The District's Historic Protection Act's potential to prevent the destruc-
tion of historic landmarks in the District should not be overemphasized,
but likewise, the numerous flaws in the Act must not be overlooked. The
District's commitment to protect its historic landmarks cannot be sup-
ported by legislation replete with loopholes. The Act's "economic hard-
ship" and "public interest" exceptions need to be more narrowly drawn
and the final decision about their applicability should not be placed with
the mayor but with an independent review board less susceptible to politi-
cal pressure. More importantly, the economic burden that landmark
designation places on owners must be relieved by new legislation if historic
preservation in the District is to become effective. The addition of a TDR
scheme into the present scheme could alleviate economic hardship through
compensation to landmark owners who are denied the ability to develop
their property.
Precedent for the use of TDR's in the District can be found in existing
zoning regulations covering PUD's and in Dupont Circle. Any TDR pro-
gram, however, should be more specific than this precedent. Legislation
should also reflect the Supreme Court's sanction of TDR in Penn Central.
Drafters should provide adequate transfer zones within the District and
110. Id See also D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-413 (1973).
111. Dupont Circle, 355 A.2d at 558.
112. The statute provides that "[a]ll regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of
building throughout each district, but the regulations in one district may differ from those in
other districts." D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-413 (1973).
113. Dupont Circle, 355 A.2d at 559.
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judicial review of administrative decisions. To alleviate further the risk of
constitutional challenges, drafters should consider the inclusion of a devel-
opment rights bank in the TDR scheme as a means to guarantee compen-
sation to owners for the actual losses sustained by landmark designation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Transfer of development rights offers a viable alternative to more tradi-
tional landmark preservation plans. TDR's can adequately compensate
landmark owners for loss of development potential from the forced preser-
vation of their property. Past experiences with TDR programs aimed at
historic preservation have shown they are not always successful; but plan-
ners armed with the hindsight afforded them by the New York Preserva-
tion Law and the Chicago Plan should be able to incorporate a successful
TDR scheme into the D.C. Historic Protection Act.
The District of Columbia offers an excellent setting for the development
of a comprehensive TDR plan. As the nation's capital, the city holds a
wealth of historic districts and landmarks. Large scale urban development
is either in progress or in the planning stage in many areas of the District.
These areas should become transfer districts designed to receive TDR's
from historic landmarks. Under a well devised TDR scheme, not only can
the historical character of the city be saved but the scheme itself could be
of financial benefit to a landmark owner. An analogous TDR concept has
already been endorsed by the D.C. courts in Dupont Circle. Although the
case was limited to voluntary transfer of development rights, the D.C.
Court of Appeals gave the concept its tacit approval. This precedent, bol-
stered by the Supreme Court's validation of a TDR program under the
New York Preservation Law in Penn Central, provides a legal foundation
for the development of a successful TDR program that could serve as a
model for other cities throughout the country.
Lonny Heselov-Dolin
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